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ABSTRACT: This paper aims to show how applying system dynamics
methodology to performance management can provide a powerful modeling per-
spective enabling public sector organizations to prevent, detect, and counteract
behavioral distortions associated with performance measurement. A dynamic per-
formance management approach is able to support performance management sys-
tem designers in outlining and implementing a consistent set of measures that can
allow public sector decision-makers to pursue sustainable organizational learning
and development. This perspective implies a major shift from a static to a dynamic
picture of organizational processes and results. It means framing delays between
causes and effects, feedback loops, and trade-offs in time and space associated with
alternative scenarios. It also means understanding how different policy levers
impact the accumulation and depletion of strategic resources over time, and deter-
mining how performance drivers affect end results. An exemplar application of this
perspective is outlined in relation to municipal crime-control policies. Unintended
behavioral consequences generated by the implementation of the CompStat pro-
gram (New York Police Department) on reward and performance management sys-
tems are framed through the “lenses” of dynamic performance management.
KEYWORDS: behavioral distortions of performance measurement, CompStat,
municipal performance, performance management, performance measurement,
PerformanceStat, performance targets.
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Throughout the last century, but particularly in the last two decades, public
management and public policy initiatives have focused on performance
through the use of targets, benchmarks, and other relatively narrow managerial
goals. Common practices include the use of benchmarks (Ammons, 1996,
1997, 1999; Coe & O'Sullivan, 1993; Eimicke, 1998; Hall & Holt, 2003; Hatry,
2006; Keehley, 1997; Keehley & Abercrombie, 2008; McNair &
Leibfried, 1992; Rivenbark & Carter, 2000); the publication of comparison
data (Hood, 2012; Micheli & Neely, 2010), the use of PerformanceStat practices
(Abramson & Behn, 2006; Behn, 2008), the use of performance budgeting
(Buck, 1949; Curristine, 2007; Ebdon & Franklin, 2006; Gross, 1969; Hall &
Holt, 2003; Harr & Godfrey, 1992; Hatry, 2007; Lu, 1998; Melkers, 2006;
Musell, 2009; Parsons, 1957; Sherwood, 1954; van Nispen & Posseth, 2006;
Willoughby, 2004), and the setting of performance targets within public
policies, such as George W. Bush's signature program, No Child Left Behind.
Yet these practices, or some of them, are commonly said to be associated
with inappropriate and counterproductive behavior (Birnberg, Turopolec, &
Young, 1983; Bohte & Meier, 2000; Bouckaert & Balk, 1991; De Bruijn,
2006; Hood, 2006; Kelman & Friedman, 2009; Leeuw, 2003; Meyer &
O'Shaughnessy, 1993; Radnor, 2005, 2010; P. Smith, 1993, 1995; Van Dooren,
Halligan, & Bouckaert, 2010). This paper examines the consequences of using
performance measurement practices for management and policy when the
dynamic conditions in which the practices are used are not fully considered
by the policy or management decision-makers when designing and implement-
ing performance practices. While the conceptual model developed in this paper
is at an early stage of analysis and is, therefore, of more interest to an academic
audience, the method of analysis used and the principle of understanding the
process while setting measures and targets is of critical significance to
practitioners who are in the day-to-day practice of setting actual performance
targets.
Although there are many differences between both programs and implemen-
tation in various countries, they all exhibit some common characteristics. In
particular, when programs focus on output or outcome targets that are to be
met without building on an understanding of the process and factors that lead
to those outputs and outcomes, they are likely to jeopardize the improvement
of service-delivery efficiency and effectiveness. For example, New York City's
CompStat may be associated with controversial activities such as stop-and-frisk,
which has been challenged in federal court (Eterno & Silverman, 2006; Judge
Won't Delay, 2013). Another example is that the performance targets of No
Child Left Behind may be associated with reported cheating scandals (Rich,
2012, 2013; Rich & Delaquérière, 2012; Winerip, Severson, & Brown, 2013).
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The design of a balanced and comprehensive set of performance standards,
based on the understanding of cause-and-effect relationships among the key
components of management strategies and related policies, is a fundamental step
to avoid the risk of an “illusion of control.” In this context, the dysfunctional
implications associated with the behavioral consequences of performance
measurement are relevant issues to overcome the risk of inverting means with
ends, or of adopting an only short-term view in implementing such programs.
Both researchers and practitioners have advocated an outcome-and-learning-
oriented perspective, fostering leadership and consensus building in perfor-
mance management.
The goal of this paper is to develop an initial qualitative dynamic perfor-
mance management insight model, showing how this model can enhance a
better understanding of the causes and effects related to adopted policies, under-
taken actions, and targeted results in the public sector. Insight system dynamics
modeling is an established practice that can be used to inform the understanding
of processes and is highly dependent on graphic demonstration (Warren, 2000,
2008; Winch & Joyce, 2006; Wolstenholme, 1999). It should not be confused
with quantitative parameter-setting modeling, which sometimes occurs as a
second stage of analysis. The point of such modeling is to identify areas where
dynamic factors may have important influence on the way a process occurs. For
performance measurement, such conceptualization may lead to a realization that
factors not directly within the control of an organization nevertheless require
observation, and also may lead to a view that some factors within the control
of the organization can be produced in too great a quantity. For the rest of this
paper, “dynamic” means changing in time and interactive with the process in
which it occurs (i.e., having a feedback characteristic). Its opposite, “static,”
means conceptualized as abstract from the process; thus, its value can change
in time, but that leads to no consequences for the process in which the static
factor is found.
After an analysis of the literature on unintended behavioral consequences of
performance management, the paper will demonstrate the benefits arising from
the use of a dynamic performance-management view in order to overcome such
risks. To apply this modeling to a specific performance practice, the paper
examines the CompStat program, adopted in 1994 by the New York Police
Department. However, CompStat serves as a model for the application of the
method; it is not the primary focus of the paper. CompStat itself has spread
to many other localities and many other functions. Baltimore adopted CitiStat,
and when the mayor became the governor of Maryland, the state adopted
StateStat and derivative programs such as BRACStat (Gibson & Julnes,
2010). New York has ParkStat and NYCHAStat.1 On the federal government
website Performance.gov, there are similarly labeled programs, such as
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FEMAStat and HUDStat.2 In particular, we show how dynamic performance
management applied to performance management programs can strengthen
the design of a consistent and comprehensive set of performance measures,
and move out of a static picture of organizational processes and results.
Unintended Consequences of Performance
Measurement: An Introduction
Robert Merton (1940) warned that employees will focus their attention on
whatever is actually set as their work expectations. Chris Argyris (1952) gave
rise to a new area of research, which is referred to as “reliance on accounting
performance measures.” Around this research stream, several scholars have
contributed in the last decades.
Hopwood (1972) examined the effects produced by different evaluation
styles, such as focus on short- vs. long-term, or accounting data vs. nonaccount-
ing data oriented. He found that a leadership style characterized by a strong
emphasis on budget-related performance is significantly associated with job-
related tension, which is dysfunctional for the organization. Otley (1978) could
not confirm some of these results; he found that subordinates’ dysfunctional
behavior, such as invalid data reporting, does not depend on superiors’ reliance
on accounting performance measures. Instead, it relates to the consistency
between adopted performance measures and the performed task. Brownell
(1982) and Hirst (1983) also carried out a similar research.
Related studies emphasize the ambiguity of performance measurement
(Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006). They have developed around “bounded rationality”
(March & Simon, 1958), organizational behavior (Cyert & March, 1963), ambi-
guities in the link between information and decision-making (March, 1987), and
around rationality and cause-and-effect relationships in decision-making
(Simon, 1955). In this regard, cognitive limitations, conflicting interests, uncer-
tainty, paradoxes, and ambivalences often make performance measurement a
difficult task. Otley (1978) shows that dysfunctional behavior in using infor-
mation provided by management accounting systems often originates from an
inconsistency between information and the complexity of the task environment,
or from technical inadequacy of the information itself (Mintzberg, 1975). This
implies that various organizational participants often ignore or even manipulate
or falsify information in order to achieve their own personal goals, regardless of
the organization's needs.
Hofstede (1967, 1978, 1981) demonstrated that the traditional cybernetic
management-control process model may generate unintended and undesirable
effects when applied to contexts where objectives are missing, unclear, or shift-
ing, and the outcomes from achieved results are not measurable. “Budget
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gaming” and opportunistic behavior are among the most evident results
emerging from a budget process and information whose structure does not fit
with the task environment. Hofstede recommended the use of political control
as an alternative to cybernetic control, which may fit with those contexts where
managerial processes and expected results can be parameterized through stan-
dards. In the political-control framework, decisions are based on negotiations
and judgment. Decisions often deal with policies, which are not composed
only of rational elements, but also consist of cultural values, which are shared
by different people belonging to a group.
Ouchi (1979) identified three different logics for management controls:
bureaucratic, market, and clan control. Again, such a distinction was based on
the characteristics of the task environment, concerning the ability to measure
outputs, and the level of knowledge of the transformation process. A “clan”
form of control, based on ritual and ceremony, was suggested for those contexts
where the ability to measure outputs is low and the knowledge of the transform-
ation process is imperfect (Birnberg et al., 1983). Lack of consideration of the
need to adopt a contingency approach in the design of management-control sys-
tems, to take into account the characteristics of the organization, may generate
an “illusion of control.” This would give rise to a number of dysfunctional con-
sequences for individuals, groups, and the organization as a whole (Dermer &
Lucas, 1986).
Though not explicitly labeled performance management, a similar approach
can be found in the conceptual framework outlined by Mintzberg (1979,
chap. 1), based on the search for consistency between the design of coordinating
mechanisms with the characteristics of tasks. As Mintzberg remarks, for com-
plex tasks characterized by unknown processes and the difficulty to measure
outputs, coordinating through standardization may generate dysfunctional
effects. Therefore, he suggests “mutual adjustment.” Although adopting a
task-coordinating mechanism may preclude adopting alternative mechanisms,
still a single unit carrying out heterogeneous tasks can use a proper mix of
mechanisms to coordinate with other units. Merchant (1982) outlined a similar
conceptual model, distinguishing action control from results and personnel
control.
On the Dysfunctional Behavioral Effects Produced by
Improper Use of Performance Measures in the Public Sector
Beginning in the 1990s, Peter Smith (1993) shows that the specific complexity
of the public sector may amplify the dysfunctional behavior effects of
improperly designed performance measures. The public sector is characterized
by a number of relevant attributes that sharply differentiate it from the private
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and “for-profit” sector, including difficulties in (1) achieving consensus on the
outputs of delivered services and on the metrics to adopt to measure them, (2)
identifying and measuring the outcomes corresponding to such outputs, (3) com-
municating with diverse stakeholders (citizens, service users, elected officials,
contractors, managers) to involve them in using performance measures and
adapting their behavior to the improvement of generated outcomes over time.
Other important complexity factors in the public sector are related to the
need to:
1. Pursue a proper fit between the profile of performance management systems
and the profile of the institutional and political/cultural systems characteriz-
ing the society where a regional public sector organization operates (Bianchi
et al., 2010; Borgonovi, 1996, p. 105);
2. Search for a sustainable performance development which is based on both an
organizational level and an interinstitutional perspective; assessing performance
sustainability requires not only a focus on the single organization's results, but
also on how such results contribute to the wider system's performance, a factor
that will affect the single organization in the long run (Bianchi, 2012, pp. 146–
149). This implies a need to adopt a joined-up whole-of-government approach
(Boyle, 1999; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007, pp. 33–35; Johnson, 2005; Pollitt,
2003). Such a perspective requires collaboration between different agencies,
ministries, and other administrative units and different independent public
and private institutions within a given region to achieve successful design,
implementation, and evaluation of public policy outcomes.
The need for joined-up government is particularly strong when cross-cutting
issues are hot topics in the political agenda, as with social policies, encompass-
ing different interconnected sectors, such as immigration, education, healthcare,
safety, welfare, and housing. Since public sector units and institutions acting to
satisfy such social needs may play different roles, with a substantial level of
autonomy, a major threat for government-wide performance is that the focus
on agency-level output measures by each player may not lead to the achieve-
ment of the wider community outcomes (P. Smith, 1993).
Such a potential inconsistency between outputs and outcomes in performance
management systems may result from a failure of decision-makers to take a
systemic view of the phenomena they address (Bianchi, 2012). As a result, pol-
icy and management decision-makers may often adopt a bounded, short-term,
and static view when selecting performance measures. Therefore, the risk of
dysfunctional behavioral effects from the improper design and use of measures
in public sector performance management may arise not only because of
an inconsistency between the adopted performance measures and the character-
istics of the task environment, but also because of a static, nonsystemic view
taken by performance management systems designers.
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With inconsistency between task and measurement, dysfunctional behavioral
effects are primarily detected at individual level. As described in the next
section, this topic has been widely studied. Such behavior is associated with
goal displacement, that is, deliberate actions of employees to pursue individual
or group goals that diverge from organizational goals, using such strategies as
misrepresentation and gaming.
With failure to consider systemic factors, dysfunctional behavioral effects are
detected at organizational level. In subsequent sections, we show that this
behavior is characterized by an emerging and gradual rather than deliberate
action. It arises from a lack of consistency in the design of performance manage-
ment systems with other coordination mechanisms, such as the rewards and
career systems. This phenomenon gives rises to a weak span of support (Simons,
2005), that is, a low propensity of the organization to produce collaborative
actions toward a group of shared goals whose achievement is considered a
means to attain both group and individual goals.
If we consider the relationship between outputs and outcomes related to a
responsibility area, the relevant boundaries of the dynamic feedback structure
generating the observed outcomes associated with the investigated problems
are often much broader than those related to the “levers” on which each orga-
nizational unit acts. Consequently, a lack of awareness of the mismatch between
the system boundaries perceived at an organizational level and those of the
broader system generating the outcomes is a major cause of dysfunctional beha-
vior. This is an emergent organizational dysfunction intrinsic to performance
management systems, rather than a behavioral dysfunction.
For example, in order to be effective in the long run, crime prevention
requires collaboration and policy coordination between different institutions.
In fact, the effectiveness of a police department is, in the long run, subordinate
to its capability not only to prevent or repress crime, but also the capability of
the wider system—schools, courts, other public safety institutions, nonprofit-
sector organizations—to keep crime under control by reducing new and reiter-
ated crime inflow and increasing repressed and solved crime outflows.
Figure 1 demonstrates that both prevention and suppression policies are rel-
evant leverage points to sustainable crime control. For example, if the police
only focus on dealing with uncontrolled—that is, unsolved—crimes, and were
made accountable to a performance measure such as the number of crimes
solved, which is an output measure, even attaining a target for this measure
alone may not lead to a reduction in the stock of uncontrolled crime in the
region, which is an outcome. Though an increasing pattern of solved crimes
might signal police efficiency, it would not necessarily imply that the police
are effective. Figure 1 shows that crime is kept in control through two balancing
loops labeled B1 and B2, which produce effective crime prevention and
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suppression policies, allowing a steady reduction to a lower crime level over
time.3 Without synergy between the different actors involved in crime control
policymaking, there is a risk that the reinforcing loop originated by reiterated
crime would prevail over the balancing loops.4
The lack of framing linkages between outputs and outcomes in performance
measurement can lead to a breakdown in the coordination between elected
officials and administrators and between different independent agencies, and
generate a fracture between managerial and political control. They may also
tend to encourage a sectorial and departmental view of administration.
Performance management systems designers, policymakers and managers must
be aware of such mismatches in order to avoid ritualistic superficial adoption of
budgeting and performance measures, leading to an illusion of control and oppor-
tunistic behavior. Conversely, broadening the observed system's boundaries, as
previously described, can support a shift of focus from measurement to manage-
ment, from data collection to systematic use of information, from an input or output
to an outcome view of organizational results (Matheson, Scanlan, & Tanner, 1997;
Moynihan, 2008), thereby using performance management systems as a learning
tool (Moynihan & Landuyt, 2009; Vakkuri & Meklin, 2006, pp. 240–242),.
Current research into the use of performance information, as compared with
its production, is mixed, but frequently suggests that it is limited at best (Behn,
Figure 1. Crime in Balance
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2002, 2003; de Lancer Julnes, 2008; de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Dooren,
Caluwé, & Lonti, 2012; Joyce, 2011; Moynihan, Lavertu, & Kamensky, 2012;
Moynihan & Pandey, 2010; Rivenbark & Ballard, 2012; van Dooren & Van de
Walle, 2008). According to Sanger (2013, p. 185), “performance measurement
rarely leads to improvement in government performance or more efficient
and accountable municipal management.” Committed leadership (Bianchi &
Rivenbark, 2012, p. 521; Moynihan, 2008, p. 78) and public service motivation
(Moynihan & Pandey, 2010) are key to implementing performance management
systems, according to a learning-oriented approach (Sanger, 2008). Performance
management ought to change behavior.
Based on the analysis conducted in this section, to move toward this direction
it can be useful to combine an “external” view (i.e., primarily outcome-oriented)
with an “internal” view (i.e., primarily output-oriented) in the design of perfor-
mance management systems for a public agency or any other autonomous public
sector organization unit (Bianchi, 2010, pp. 373–375).
Profiling the Causes Underlying Dysfunctional
Behavioral Effects Produced by Improper Use of
Performance Measures in the Public Sector
It is possible to distinguish three major limitations of performance measurement,
that is, attribution, representation of quality, and goal displacement (de Lancer
Julnes, 2006):
Attribution refers to the possibility that the causal connection between
outputs and outcomes and corresponding actions might be erroneous, biased,
or partial. This error can undermine accountability, performance evaluations,
objectives or actions, and motivation.
Representation of quality refers to an intrinsic problem in any attempt to
measure the results of accomplished actions, and related outcomes (Bouckaert
& Halligan, 2008, chap. 8). On the one hand, use of a single performance
measure will have the high risk of a simplistic and partial analysis of causation.
On the other hand, use of a broad and detailed set of performance measures
leads to a less selective analysis and unclear interpretation of emerging results
(Van Dooren et al., 2010, p. 160).
Flamholtz (1996) defines goal displacement as “a lack of goal congruence
created by motivation to achieve some goals sought by the organization at the
expense of other intended goals.” It may be caused by several phenomena,
including suboptimization, selective attention to organizational goals, and inver-
sion of means and ends. Suboptimization occurs when the performance of an
organizational unit is achieved at the expense of another unit, or the organiza-
tion as a whole. Selective attention occurs when certain goals are pursued at
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the expense of other goals. Birnberg et al. (1983, pp. 121–122) labeled such
phenomenon “focusing.” Inversion of means and ends occurs when performance
measures and reward systems motivate people to achieve intermediate results
rather than the overall organizational goals. The last two phenomena have also
been labeled “tunnel vision” and “myopia,” respectively (P. Smith, 1993, 1995).
Bohte and Meier (2000) define goal displacement as individual's tendency to
maximize certain outputs at the expense of related outcomes. They identify three
major forms of organizational cheating: cutting corners, lying, and biasing sam-
ples. Cutting corners occurs when decision-makers focus on quantity rather than
quality. Lying occurs when decision-makers try to take advantage of information
asymmetries between their agencies and external evaluators, providing infor-
mation that may put them in a positive light. Biasing samples implies that
decision-makers select or report only those cases that lead to mostly positive
evaluations. For instance, agency activity may only be directed toward easy
cases requiring a minor effort, rather than other more difficult cases.
Other similar dysfunctional behaviors encouraged by an excessive use of out-
come-related performance indicators (ORPIs) include (P. Smith, 1993, 1995):
. convergence: “an emphasis on not being exposed as an outlier on any
Outcome-Related Performance Indicators (ORPI), rather than the desire to
be outstanding” (P. Smith, 1993, p. 141);
. ossification: “a disinclination to experiment with new and innovative
methods” (P. Smith, 1993, p. 141);
. misrepresentation: a “deliberate manipulation of data so that reported beha-
vior differs from actual behavior” (P. Smith, 1995, p. 292). Birnberg et al.
(1983, pp. 121–124) identified a number of ways to distort the information
system, such as: “smoothing,” “biasing,” “filtering,” and “illegal acts”;
. gaming: a “deliberate manipulation of behavior to secure strategic advan-
tage” (Radnor, 2005; P. Smith, 1995, p. 298). Van Dooren et al. (2010,
pp. 162–165) have qualified similar phenomena as “measure fixation” and
“cream skimming,” which is selecting at intake (Behn & Kant, 1999).
Based on this framework, Vakkuri and Meklin (2006, pp. 244–246) observe that
the list of possible dysfunctions originates from heterogeneous theoretical and
methodological underpinnings, including the theory of accounting measurement
(e.g., tunnel vision, misrepresentation, and convergence), optimization theory (e.
g., suboptimization), the theory of organizational behavior and learning (e.g.,
myopia, ossification), and game theory (e.g., gaming). The heterogeneity of the
research field may suggest the need for a more theoretical discussion of ambiguity.
Vakkuri and Meklin claim that if it is true that “the users may deliberately employ
performance measurement systems for their unique individual, organizational and
political purposes” (2006, p. 244), it is also true that “performance measurement
systems set the conditions for organizational actors to adapt to” (2006, p. 245).
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Distortions in interpreting performance information can also result from
characteristics of the adopted measurement system rather than to the behavior
of people. For instance, this may happen when phenomena are measured more
frequently and accurately than in the past, which may generate a feeling of an
increase of its intensiveness in comparison to when the phenomena were not
so closely monitored (Bouckaert & Balk, 1991).
Detecting, Preventing, and Explaining Unintended
Effects of Performance Measurement in the Public Sector:
The “Performance Paradox” Theory
The term “performance paradox” (Leeuw, 2003; Meyer & O'Shaughnessy,
1993) frames dysfunctional effects of performance management where phenom-
enon are characterized by a weak capability of performance indicators to mea-
sure and affect performance (Meyer & Gupta, 1994). The performance paradox
implies that adopted indicators lose the capability to discriminate between good
and bad performers because organizations adapt their performance (i.e., actions)
to them without actual improvement (Van Dooren et al., 2010, p. 165; Van Thiel
& Leeuw, 2002, p. 271).
These researchers describe positive learning, which is an increased ability
over time to reach performance targets without necessarily improving actual
organizational performance, particularly in terms of outcomes. They also
describe perverse learning, in which actual performance is misrepresented
through overstatement or understatement of performance, thus challenging the
quality and effectiveness of a performance management system. The underlying
cause is often a focus on too few measures, perhaps only one; or on only short-
term measures, which should rather be considered as “drivers” (together with
other measures) for the attainment of outcome measures that describing the
value generated by the public sector to service users and the community. There-
fore, while positive learning can be considered a physiological characteristics of
the “performance paradox,” requiring periodic revision of adopted performance
measures and standards, a disconnect between performance drivers and end-
results (and, more broadly, a static approach) as well as a too tight scope of
adopted indicators can be considered as recurring pathologies of the investigated
phenomenon.
Van Thiel & Leeuw (2002, p. 271) provide an interesting example of the
risks of under- or overstatement of performance in the case of the Dutch police.
They discuss the use of an aggregate performance measure of the percentage or
number of crimes solved by the police. If we treat the percentage of crimes
solved as a single critical performance measure, a decrease in it might suggest
that police performance is deteriorating. However, the reduction in the
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percentage of crimes solved could result from an increase in the stock of crimes
because of an increase in the volume of new crimes. The absolute number of
crimes solved might remain constant or even increase, yet the ratio of inflow
(new crimes) to outflow (solved crimes) could also increase. These circum-
stances reflect a potential shortage of resources or a simple need to adjust to
new circumstances, not poor performance per se. Likewise, an increase in the
crimes solved over a number of years should normally lead to a reduction in
the stock of criminals; thus making it more difficult to continue improving or
even to keep the absolute number of crimes solved. However, a reduction in this
measure resultant from a drop in the stock of criminals would not indicate
performance deterioration.
This example suggests that where a change in an environmental variable is an
intended program objective, targets should be linked to changes in the stock of
that environmental variable, particularly when that variable is associated with
the change in a single adopted performance target. In the analyzed case, this
would mean that the absolute target of crimes to be solved might be reduced
as the corresponding stock of potential criminals declines. A problem in imple-
menting this correction could be that it is difficult to estimate the number of
criminals, particularly if one considers that there is often a number of unknown
crimes, and of potential criminals.
In this case, focusing on a single performance measure—and in such a static
manner—can generate unintended consequences. For example, targeting a con-
stant or rising number or percentage of solved crimes, regardless of the
reduction in the stock of criminals, might lead to gaming (i.e., perverse learn-
ing). The police might increase (even beyond the socially tolerable levels) press-
ure on the community in search of a number of crimes to solve. This is a typical
example of inversion between means and ends.
The problem could be exacerbated by the use of a single aggregate measure
of crime, rather than by differentiating crimes, such as felonies from misdemea-
nors. Moreover, if one considers the number of crimes rather than the number of
criminals, performance evaluation might be affected by the percentage of crimes
committed by several people together, as, for instance, in the case of vandalism.
If we take this phenomenon into account, the adopted performance measure
should also have to consider the number of arrested criminals per crime solved.5
Extending the boundaries of the observed system might reduce the risk of
performance paradox. For example, rather than focusing on only the crimes
solved, the police might also be made accountable on a set of measures that
would describe the effectiveness of their crime-prevention efforts. Obviously,
one should properly estimate the different delays characterizing the connection
between the adoption of crime-prevention policies and their effects on the two
inflows related to new committed crimes and new criminals. Although focusing
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on output measures may give a feeling of certainty and clarity in performance
measurement, combining output with outcome measures is likely to better sup-
port purposeful action, coordination between actors, and reporting to different
stakeholders. A focus on crime prevention, combined with suppression, would
allow the police to take an active role in designing and implementing broader
social policies, in coordination with others, such as schools, social services,
nonprofits, and associated stakeholders.
Another measure that may help prevent a performance paradox is using
mechanisms to track inertial phenomena that gradually deplete resources affect-
ing organizational outputs and outcomes. Such phenomena are characterized by
slow continuous flows depleting relevant stocks, which after perhaps long
delays suddenly generate destructive effects and are difficult to perceive by sta-
tic performance measurement systems. Though the destructive effects appear
unexpected and unpredictable, they might be tracked in advance, allowing cor-
rective or preventive measures, if the weak signs of change in a number of
(often intangible) resources are detected by the performance management
system.
Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002, p. 276) provide the example of a fireworks
factory explosion that killed more than 20 people in Enschede, Netherlands,
in 2000. The tragedy might have been avoided if the monitoring process by
the local and central governments, inspectorates, and the fire department over
a number of “small” illegal activities had been regularly and effectively carried
out. Lack of supervision over these activities allowed automatic renewal of a
number of licenses to operate in a residential area. The gradual accumulation
of small problems inertially reduced the level of strategic resource of public
safety of the area. Although the potential problem was constantly rising, it
was not evident to the community, until the tragedy manifested it as a com-
pletely new event. The explosion of a fertilizer plant in West, Texas, in the
spring of 2013, reflecting storage of anhydrous ammonia without proper federal
reporting, may reflect a similar condition (M. Smith, 2013).
This evidence suggests that public performance management processes will
benefit from a more systems-oriented and dynamic approach. A performance
management system will be more sustainable when it considers how organiza-
tional activities contribute to the buildup and deployment of tangible and intan-
gible stocks of strategic resources, with a view to affect a balanced set of outputs
and outcomes. This perspective should also consider whether a public sector
organization is affected by the activities of other organizations, public or
private, when it delivers service users and the community.
In the next section, we will examine how to build and implement dynamic
performance management systems to prevent, detect, and counteract the risks
of performance paradox in public sector organizations.
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Dynamic Performance Management: A Modeling Perspective to
Support Organizations to Prevent, Detect, and Counteract
Behavioral Distortions Associated with Performance Measurement
An approach to overcome the myopic view in designing and using performance
measures is system dynamics (SD). SD is a modeling methodology to map
system structure to capture and communicate the behavior driving processes
and the quantification of the relationships to produce a set of equations that form
the basis for simulating possible system behaviors over time. Insight (qualitative)
modeling focuses on mapping that emphasizes approximate graphical represen-
tation of the system. The principle is, that if process structure determines system
behavior, and system behavior determines organization performance (Davidsen,
1991; Richardson & Pugh, 1981; Sterman, 2000, pp. 28–29), then the key to
developing sustainable strategies to improve performance is acknowledging the
relationship between processes and behaviors and managing the leverage points
(Ghaffarzadegan, Lyneis, & Richardson, 2011). The advantage of using this
approach is it places performance measures within the broader context of the sys-
tem (Bianchi & Rivenbark, 2014), responding to the reality that even simple pol-
icy and process changes to impact specific outputs and outcomes are not likely to
be that “simple” in organizations (Bianchi, Winch, & Tomaselli, 2008).
A key for applying SD to performance management is the instrumental view
of performance (Bianchi, 2012, pp. 153–155), which makes alternative means
for improving performance that explicitly identify both end-results and their dri-
vers. To affect such drivers, each responsible entity must build up, preserve, and
deploy strategic resources that are systemically linked to each other. Strategic
resources are modeled as stocks of available tangible or intangible factors in
a given time. Their dynamics depend on the value of corresponding inflows
and outflows. Such flows are modeled as valves on which decision-makers
can act through their policies, in order to influence the dynamics of each stra-
tegic resource, and, through them, performance (Bianchi, 2010).
Sustainable development is attained by maintaining an appropriate balance
between strategic resources. Each strategic resource should provide the basis
to sustain others in the same system. For instance, both workers and equipment
provide capacity, which influences perceived service quality. This affects
regional attractiveness, which, in turn, influences population dynamics. A
change in regional population will affect workload and perhaps the stock of
available financial resources, and eventually capacity and service. The feedback
loops underlying the dynamics of the different strategic resources imply that the
flows affecting such resources are measured over a time lag. Therefore, under-
standing how delays influence strategic resources and achieved results becomes
a key issue for managing performance in complex dynamic systems.
408 PPMR = March 2015
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r C
arm
ine
 B
ian
ch
i] 
at 
05
:17
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
Managing strategic resources to affect performance is a dynamic and
complex task. In fact, intangible resources (e.g., organizational climate, trust,
knowledge, and image) are difficult to identify and measure. Furthermore,
processes of accumulation and drain affecting the dynamics of strategic
resources are inertial, since delays underlying them are difficult for decision-
makers to perceive, and also because effects generated by actions taken, or
not taken, in the recent or remote past are intertwined with each other, and single
causes cannot be easily matched to related effects. A critical tipping point in
managing strategic resources to affect organizational performance is associated
with the capability of policymakers to (1) identify those strategic resources that
most determine success in the environment, (2) ensure that the endowment of
such resources is satisfactory over time, and (3) keep a proper balance between
the different strategic resources.
Figure 2 examines the Dutch police case using an instrumental dynamic
performance management (DPM) model. It divides performance into three
linked levels: strategic resources → performance drivers → end-results, which
are separated by dotted-line boxes. On the left at the top is a key for the various
symbols, and below that is an outline of the conceptual framework. To the right
of the outline, these concepts are applied as they may relate to functions and
dysfunctions generated by the performance paradox. Focusing on a single static
Figure 2. Dutch Policing Dynamic Performance Management (DPM) Model
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performance measure might lead the police to increase the number or percentage
of solved crimes regardless of any reduction in the stock of criminals, which
would make it more difficult to attain the same performance level in succeeding
years. In the top box, Level 1, the police focus on inflows of strategic resources,
such as staff and equipment, to offset outflows of the same. They deploy these to
address inflows of crimes and criminals, converting them to outflows through
solved crimes and identified criminals. The purpose of these actions is to inves-
tigate and control crime (a performance driver, shown at Level 2 of Figure 2)
and thereby solve crimes (an end-result shown at Level 3).
To counteract the problem of diminishing returns, the police might increase
the pressure on the community in search of a number of crimes to solve, eventu-
ally reaching an intolerable level of intrusion into the lives of community mem-
bers. So in this example, the risk of gaming is associated with the possibility that
without a deliberate purpose, the police staff and other strategic resources might
be deployed to pursue performance drivers, such workload measures as the
number of controls or investigations undertaken, with the intent to achieve
numerical targets.
If solving crimes and reducing the corresponding stock of criminals contrib-
ute to the community's quality of life, an excess of controls and investigations
may offset in the long run the positive effects of the described policy, as shown
by the second effect on the right side of Level 3 in Figure 2. This might reduce
the community's quality of life. This could generate both a reduction in the
population level and an increase in the inflow of new crimes. In other words,
an excess of focus and intensive efforts on a single policy might generate spe-
cific dysfunctional effects over time. In this case, such effects could be related to
an increase of the number of crimes per inhabitant (shown on the right side of
Level 2 in Figure 2), which would further reduce the community's quality of life,
a vicious reinforcing loop.6
This analysis suggests a possible way to counteract the behavioral distortions
arising from the performance paradox by extending the boundaries of the
observed system to adopt policies that might reduce the risk of gaming and
unintended behavioral effects. For example, the police might also be made
accountable on a set of measures that would gauge the effectiveness of crime
prevention. A focus on crime prevention combined with crime suppression
would also allow the police to engage in designing and implementing broader
social policies in coordination with other actors.
Figure 3 shows how instrumental DPM modeling might extend the system's
boundaries. It shows that when considering additional end-results related to the
stock of criminals, two more flows are taken into account: the effect on new
criminals and the effect on new potential criminals.7 There are many reasons
why addressing criminals leads to new criminals; for example, it produces
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opportunity for those who would otherwise be deterred by competition, and it
removes criminals the police already know from the environment. Correspond-
ingly, the stock of potential criminals is added as a relevant strategic resource to
include when formulating policies that may contribute to sustainable community
security. In addition, a second set of performance drivers is included in this
alternative context: the number of preventive actions.
In the next section, we use DPM to frame a number of problematic behavioral
issues and related implications on performance management emerging from the
CompStat program of the New York Police Department and other similar
programs adopted over the last two decades.
Applying Dynamic Performance Management to
Analyze the Behavioral Distortions Associated with
Performance Measurement: Insights from the CompStat
Program of the New York Police Department
In 1994, the New York City police introduced CompStat, a statistics-based
performance measurement system aimed at motivating employees, with a spe-
cific focus on precinct commanders, to sharply reduce crime (Behn, 2003,
p. 591; Silverman, 1999, pp. 88–89, 101). It is claimed that in New York City,
Figure 3. Extended Dutch Policing DPM Model
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after CompStat was introduced, major crimes declined over 76% (Eterno &
Silverman, 2010, p. 428). Following the successful results of CompStat, similar
programs or other police performance monitoring programs have been widely
adopted by other cities in the United States (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally,
Greenspan, & Willis, 2003; Willis, Kochel, & Mastrofski, 2010), Australia
(Chilvers & Weatherburn, 2004; Mazerolle, McBroom, & Rombouts, 2011;
Mazerolle, Rombouts, & McBroom, 2007), the United Kingdom (Hamelin &
Spenlehauer, 2013), and elsewhere (Davis, 2010).
Similarly, the “Stat” model has been adopted well beyond policing; for
example, CitiStat is
a data-driven management system designed to monitor and improve the perfor-
mance of city departments in real-time. Implemented in Baltimore in 2000 by then
Mayor Martin O'Malley, CitiStat uses basic, inexpensive computer software to track
a myriad of government performance indicators. Managers of each city department
report to City Hall every two weeks to present their performance data and answer
questions from the mayor's office. The mayor's office uses this data to identify
underperformance and press for improvements. (Perez & Rushing, 2007, p. 3)
After Mayor O'Malley was elected governor of Maryland, Baltimore may
have lost its enthusiasm for CitiStat (Broadwater, 2012); however, the mayor,
now governor, took the practice with him to the statehouse, creating StateStat.8
These various programs draw on the “broken windows” theory; Wilson and
Kelling (1982) theorized that to prevent major crime, police must attend to
minor quality-of-life offenses and use assertive methods. According to this
theory, unattended broken windows are a symptom of neglect in a district,
and neglect leads to social disorder, inertial decay of daily quality of life, and
more severe property damage, ultimately leading to a spiral of urban decay
(Eterno & Silverman, 2012, p. 192). Eterno and Silverman remark that
“CitiStat's timely data permits the assessment and coordination of diverse social
services dealing with graffiti, abandoned vehicles, vacant housing, lead paint
abatement, urban blight, drugs, and drug treatment” (p. 15).
According to Boba Santos (2012, p. 43), the success of CompStat is
explained by two reasons: (1) a very efficient information system enables
decision-makers and performance evaluators to rely on up-to-date data on
computerized crime, arrest, and “quality of life,” and (2) this information can
regularly be used for interactive crime prevention and reduction strategy meet-
ings, where commanders are held accountable for a number of output measures
related to crime in their districts. As described by Eterno & Silverman (2012,
pp. 24–25), during the weekly meetings at police headquarters, “charts and maps
compare index crime… numbers to the same period last year at three levels:
weekly, 28 days, and year to date…. Always being compared to last year's num-
bers can be a real burden, especially if your previous year was exceptional.”9
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During a meeting, each commander stands at a podium and presents statistics on
crime control in his precinct to the top management (police commissioner, first
deputy commissioner, or others). The commander and his collaborators are held
accountable for the achieved outputs. His career and rewards are affected by the
measured and reported outputs.
It may happen that “commanders are berated and embarrassed in front of
their peers because the numbers do not look ‘correct’ ” (Eterno & Silverman,
2012, p. 25), that is, they do not correspond to the performance targets.
According to Robert Zink (as cited in Eterno & Silverman, 2012, p. 62), this
“has degenerated into a situation where the police leadership presses subordi-
nates to keep numbers low by any means necessary.”Manipulating or “fudging”
crime data has been mentioned as a recurring practice adopted by the police to
generate the expected numbers to report; for instance: “misclassify crimes from
felonies to misdemeanors, under-value the property lost to crime so it's not a fel-
ony” (Eterno & Silverman, 2012, p. 27). Therefore, despite reports of success in
fighting crime, CompStat and other similar programs can be a cause of dysfunc-
tional behavior and performance paradox.
Behn (2011) defines “Campbell's law” as, “The more any quantitative social
indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to cor-
ruption pressures, and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social
pressures it is intended to monitor” Campbell (1969). as This rule is relevant
to crime control performance measurement, where Eterno and Silverman
(2012, p. 11) argue that focus on the short run is detrimental to the intended
long-run effect, “False arrests have been identified as the result of arrest
quotas… arrest quotas may encourage police to focus on less difficult and
important arrests at the expense of more significant and arduous arrests.”10
The remaining figures show how system dynamics can be used to diagnosis
performance management systems dysfunctionality and help identify the causes
behind a “performance paradox” so that decision-makers can act to avert them.11
Figure 4 illustrates the distorted effects on reported crime produced by
performance measures and by a reward system focused on only short-term and
“easy to achieve” output measures (quotas). The balancing loop B1would be the
functional response of the performance management system to the actual crime
level. An increase of this level would imply a higher effort to suppress crime, lead-
ing (after a delay) to a reduction of crime. However, the use of an unbalanced set of
performance measures and of short-term “output-only-based” reward mechanisms
could hamper the dominance of the described balancing loop by fostering two
other loops: the reinforcing vicious loop R and the balancing loop B2.
The reinforcing loop R is generated by an increasing effort to solve “easy”
crimes due to the existing set of performance measurement and rewards systems
and, therefore, to report an increasing pattern of such kinds of crimes. This
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generates an increase in the distributed rewards, which in turn gives rise to a
“search” for new “easy-to-solve” crime to deal with and report. Though such
a vicious loop can contribute to reduce crime (in absolute terms), it might not
generate the desired effects in dealing with “hard-to-solve” crimes. On the other
hand, the described system could also affect the statistics regarding such crimes
through data fudging. The distribution of rewards may lead the police to reduce
reported hard-to-solve crime and shift part of it to the lower rank of easy-to-
solve crime. This may generate a further effort towards the suppression of
easy-to–solve crimes. So while the loop B2 dominance replaces the loop B1,
it is also the basis for the loop R to further and progressively generate its
dysfunctional effects.
In practice, the unbalanced condition may be equated to New York City's
intense focus on small crimes using stop-and-frisk practices, having the possible
effect of producing crimes where none exist. Possibly New York does not
adequately attend to serious crimes—by, for example, downgrading serious
crimes to misdemeanors (Ruderman, 2012). Thus, it may allow the more
professional criminal population to grow.
Figure 4. Distorting Effects of Short-Term Output Measures
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Figure 5 adopts an instrumental DPM approach to detect the dysfunctional-
ities caused by lack of alignment between performance management and
rewards systems. The figure shows that when performance measurement and
rewards generate “false reporting” on easy-to-solve cases, the performance
management system becomes the means for the organization to reach the
desired rewards. In other words, the performance management system here
takes an ancillary role in respect to the rewards system, rather than using it
to pursue sustainable organizational development. As illustrated in the area
labeled Level 1, the use of strategic resources is primarily diverted by the
rewards system to the execution of controls and preventive actions on easy
cases. This effort contributes to meet the output targets, shown as flows of easy
cases solved.
There are two effects. First, it allows the organization to distribute rewards
based on the achievement of the target number of cases to solve (shown in
the top box on the right). The large volume of solved easy cases reinforces
the process and leads to an expectation of more similar cases, which implies that
organization redirects efforts to such cases. On the other hand, although an
increase in the outflow of easy cases solved should lead to a reduction in the
stock of easy-to-solve crimes, this does not happen, because of the inflow of
new false cases. This variable is shown as an output of the rewards system at
Figure 5. A DPM Model to Detect Distortions
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the bottom right of Figure 5. The volume of false cases is proportional to effort,
which is proportional to the stock of targeted number of crimes to solve.
Therefore, an abnormal behavior of the rewards system here generates a set
of end-results, which may allow the rewards regardless of organizational results.
On the contrary, the results measured by the performance management system
become the internalized method to pursue the rewards. A further vicious effect
can be that unattended hard crimes might allow increase of hard-crime criminals
who become skilled, leading to a gradual long-run reduction in the city's quality
of life.
The insights emerging from the previous examples suggest possible measures
to counteract these potential problems. Figure 6 shows that improving the per-
formance management system may lead to greater reporting promptness and
selectiveness. This implies investing in performance measurement and infor-
mation systems and also in organizational design and human capital. Behn
(2008, p. 5) argues that one of the main errors committed in implementing
CompStat, CitiStat, and similar programs has been the lack of dedicated analytic
staff to design proper performance management systems and support decision-
makers in interpreting the results emerging from performance measurement.
For instance, as shown in Figure 4, improving the promptness and selectiveness
of reporting may allow decision-makers to design policies that better balance
Figure 6. An Improved DPM Model
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capacity allocation in solving hard and easy crimes. Balancing the mix of achieved
end-results may contribute to the more sustainable development of a public sector
organization and the region. This is shown in Figure 4 through the outcomemeasure
for “change in community quality of life.” This variable is, in turn, affected by a
performance driver, the “crime seriousness ratio,” which is significantly affected
by the stock of hard-to-solve crimes as a share of total crimes.
Conclusions
This paper has shown how dynamic performance management can be used to
analyze and diagnose the performance paradox, that is, the weak capability
of adopted performance measures to affect performance, especially because of
behavioral distortions resulting from the use of available data and information.
Although such behavioral distortions are a product of human nature, particularly
when quantitative indicators are used to affect decision-making, they can be
amplified by improper design of performance management systems.
On the one hand, a possible cause of this phenomenon may be an inconsist-
ency between specific adopted performance measures and the corresponding
task environment. In this case, behavioral distortions in using performance mea-
sures tend to be rooted at the individual level, and are due to the use of perfor-
mance measures that do not fit the characteristics of the activities performed
within an organization.
On the other hand, behavioral distortions in using performance measures can
be primarily related to a bounded and static perspective in the design of overall
performance management systems. This phenomenon can imply discontinuity
between (1) outputs and outcomes, (2) the political and administrative levels,
and (3) different institutions playing complementary roles in pursuing social
policies (i.e., lack of joined-up government). In this case, unintended behavioral
phenomena that are relevant to performance management are primarily rooted at
the organizational or group, rather than individual, level. In fact, the main
responsibility for the dysfunctional behavior can be attributed to the inconsistent
design of the performance and related systems (e.g., rewards and career), which
is the primary cause of a flow of organizational actions in a direction that is not
sustainable in the long run.
This second cause of behavioral distortions in performance measurement has
been examined through dynamic performance management, with an exemplar
case of municipal crime control policies, particularly the CompStat program.
Though we believe that this paper has shown the usefulness of dynamic perfor-
mance management as a method to foster a cause-and-effect perspective in deal-
ing with behavioral distortions associated with city's performance measurement
programs, we also believe that further research will be needed to better frame,
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and possibly outline the main archetypes related to different typologies of the
recurring dysfunctions associated with the analyzed problem contexts.
This paper provides a conceptual basis for empirical examination of perfor-
mance “Stat” practices using dynamic modeling. Future research should focus
on empirical examination of this model to determine its applicability, and more
specifically should tune the identified characteristics to criminal justice or other
“Stat” style performance management systems and later seek to calibrate such
models. Empirical modeling will measure the relationships, verify their positive
or negative signs, and possibly identify other relationships that more completely
describe the system. When such models are determined, policymakers and man-
agers are in a better position to influence the system to attain the desired results.
Notes
1. New York City Housing Authority Stat, currently offline beginning with the
emergency response to Hurricane Sandy.
2. It is not clear how closely the federal practice follows the local practices it is partly
modeled after.
3. The signs on the arrows in Figure 1 show direct and inverse relationships between
variables. A reinforcing loop is determined by a positive polarity, while a negative polarity
implies a balancing loop. While a reinforcing loop generates multiplicative growth in the
affected variable's behavior mode and implies instability in the system, a balancing loop
fosters a stable behavior (Forrester, 1961).
4. The hypothesized reinforcing loop paradoxically increases crime because the police
may lose the main point of their work, as discussed later in this paper.
5. This discussion is not intended to suggest that any existing measurement system
exhibits all the potential errors identified. It describes risks and sources of risk.
6. Though the described model is intentionally simple, it is worth remarking that the
stock of criminals should be divided into several classes related to the seriousness of commit-
ted crimes. Lack of clarity in the method for distinguishing and categorizing crimes might
encourage gaming behavior by police decision-makers, with the intent to maximize outputs,
performance rating, and related rewards. In fact, police might simultaneously oversolve easy-
to-solve crimes (e.g., through stop-and-frisk techniques) and undersolve hard-to-solve crimes.
Of course, categorizing crimes may also have a perverse effect if it permits gaming by
reclassifying serious crimes to less serious categories. In this regard, it has been emphasized
that there is a need to design clear rules to avoid catching the “dolphins” rather than the
“sharks” (Maple & Mitchell, 1999, p. 155).
7. To avoid excessive complexity, Figure 3 does not show the link from Level 3
backwards to Level 1 for potential criminals and criminals.
8. See details of Maryland's StateStat at http://www.statestat.maryland.gov, accessed
November 10, 2013.
9. Index crime includes: murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny
auto, and grand larceny.
10. M. Murray states, “In 2005, New York's city's patrolmen's union reported that
productivity arrest quotas resulted in the arrest of an 80-year-old man for feeding pigeons
and a pregnant woman for sitting down to rest on a subway station” (as cited in Eterno &
Silverman, 2012, p. 11).
11. Rouwette et al. (2004) have recently developed an interesting study on system
dynamics applied to crime control.
418 PPMR = March 2015
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r C
arm
ine
 B
ian
ch
i] 
at 
05
:17
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
References
Abramson, M. A., & Behn, R. D. (2006). The varieties of CitiStat. Public Administration
Review, 66(3), 332–340.
Ammons, D. N. (1996). Municipal benchmarks: Assessing local performance and
establishing community standards. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Ammons, D. N. (1997). Raising the performance bar locally. Public Management, 79(9),
10–16.
Ammons, D. N. (1999). A proper mentality for benchmarking. Public Administration
Review, 59(2), 105–109.
Argyris, C. (1952). The impact of budgets on people. Ithaca, NY: Controllership
Foundation.
Behn, R. D. (2002). The psychological barriers to performance management; or,
Why isn't everyone jumping on the performance-management bandwagon? Public
Performance & Management Review, 26, 5–25.
Behn, R. D. (2003). Why measure performance? Different purposes require different
measures. Public Administration Review, 63(5), 586–606.
Behn, R. D. (2008). The seven big errors of PerformanceStat. Policy Briefs, Rappaport
Institute for Greater Boston, Taubman Center for State and Local Government. Avail-
able at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/thebehnreport/Behn,%207PerformanceStatErrors.
pdf, accessed February 19, 2015.
Behn, R. D. (2011). Be aware (and beware) of the Campbell's Law. Behn Report, 9.
Available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/thebehnreport/All%20Issues/August2011.
pdf, accessed February 19, 2015.
Behn, R. D., & Kant, P. A. (1999). Strategies for avoiding the pitfalls of performance
contracting. Public Productivity & Management Review, 22, 470–489.
Bianchi, C. (2010). Improving performance and fostering accountability in the public
sector through system dynamics modelling: From an “external” to an “internal”
perspective. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 27(4), 361–384.
Bianchi, C. (2012). Enhancing performance management and sustainable organizational
growth through system-dynamics modelling. In S. N. Grösser & R. Zeier (Eds.),
Systemic management for intelligent organizations: Concepts, models-based
approaches and applications (pp. 143–161). Berlin: Springer.
Bianchi, C., & Rivenbark, W. C. (2012a). A comparative analysis of performance
management systems. Public Performance & Management Review, 35(3), 509–526.
Bianchi, C., & Rivenbark, W. C. (2014). Performance management in local government:
The application of system dynamics to promote data use. International Journal of
Public Administration, 37(13), 945–954.
Bianchi, C., Winch, G. W., & Tomaselli, S. (2008). Management simulation as an
instrument to aid turning “stunted growth” round in family businesses. Sinergie,
75, 109–126.
Bianchi, C., Bivona, E., Cognata, A., Ferrara, P., Landi, T., & Ricci, P. (2010). Applying
system dynamics to foster organizational change, accountability and performance in
the public sector: A case‐based Italian perspective. Systems Research and Behavioral
Science, 27(4), 395–420.
Birnberg, J. G., Turopolec, L., & Young, S. M. (1983). The organizational context of
accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 8(2/3), 111–129.
Boba Santos, R. (2012). Crime analysis with crime mapping. London: SAGE.
Bohte, J., & Meier, K. J. (2000). Goal displacement: Assessing the motivation for
organizational cheating. Public Administration Review, 60(2), 173–182.
Bianchi & Williams / PUBLIC PERFORMANCE & MANAGEMENT REVIEW 419
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r C
arm
ine
 B
ian
ch
i] 
at 
05
:17
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
Borgonovi, E. (1996). Principi e sistemi aziendali per le amministrazioni pubbliche
[Management principles and systems for public administrations]. Milan: Egea.
Bouckaert, G., & Balk, W. (1991). Public productivity measurement: Diseases and cures.
Public Productivity & Management Review, 15, 229–235.
Bouckaert, G., & Halligan, J. (2008). Managing performance: International compari-
sons. New York: Psychology Press.
Boyle, R. (1999). The management of cross-cutting issues. Discussion Paper no. 8.
Available at http://www.ipa.ie/pdf/DiscussionPaper_8.pdf, accessed February 19,
2015.
Broadwater, L. (2012). New CitiStat director pledges transparency. Baltimore Sun, October
14. Available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-10-13/news/bs-md-sun-
investigates-citistat-20121009_1_citistat-data-deputy-mayor-christopher-thomaskutty-
yolanda-jiggetts accessed February 19, 2015.
Brownell, P. (1982). The role of accounting data in performance evaluation, budgetary
participation, and organizational effectiveness. Journal of Accounting Research, 20
(1), 12–27.
Buck, A. E. (1949). Performance budgeting for the federal government. Tax Review, 10
(7), 33–37.
Campbell, D. T. (1969). Reforms as experiments. American Psychologist, 24(4),
409–429.
Chilvers, M., & Weatherburn, D. (2004). The New South Wales “CompStat” process: Its
impact on crime. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 37(1), 22–48.
Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2007). Transcending New Public Management: The
transformation of public sector reforms. Surrey, UK: Ashgate.
Coe, C. K., & O Sullivan, E. (1993). Accounting for the hidden costs: A national
study of internal service funds and other indirect costing methods in municipal
governments. Public Administration Review, 53(1), 59.
Curristine, T. (Ed.). (2007). Performance budgeting in OECD countries. Paris: OECD.
Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALMGMT/Resources/
313217-1196229169083/4441154-1196275288288/4444688-1196378494429/Perfor-
manceBudgetinginOECDCountries.pdf, accessed February 19, 2015.
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Davidsen, P. (1991). The structure-behavior graph. System Dynamics Group,
Cambridge, MA: MIT.
Davis, R. C. (2010). Introduction: The use of policing indicators in the developing
world. International Journal of Police Science & Management, 12(2), 140–154.
De Bruijn, H. (2006). Managing performance in the public sector. London: Routledge.
de Lancer Julnes, P. (2006). Performance measurement: An effective tool for govern-
ment accountability? The debate goes on. Evaluation, 12(2), 219.
de Lancer Julnes, P. (2008). Performance management: Beyond instrumental use. In
W. Van Dooren & S. Van de Walle (Eds.), Performance information in the public
sector: How it is used (pp. 58–71). Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
de Lancer Julnes, P., & Holzer, M. (2001). Promoting the utilization of performance
measures in public organizations: An empirical study of factors affecting adoption
and implementation. Public Administration Review, 61(6), 693–708.
Dermer, J. D., & Lucas, R. G. (1986). The illusion of managerial control. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 11(6), 471–482.
Dooren, W. V., Caluwé, C. D., & Lonti, Z. (2012). How to measure public administra-
tion performance: A conceptual model with applications for budgeting, human
420 PPMR = March 2015
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r C
arm
ine
 B
ian
ch
i] 
at 
05
:17
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
resources management, and open government. Public Performance & Management
Review, 35(3), 489–508.
Ebdon, C., & Franklin, A. L. (2006). Citizen participation in budgeting theory. Public
Administration Review, 66(3), 437–447.
Eimicke, W. B. (1998). Benchmarking for best practices in the public sector achieving
improved performances in public organizations: A guide for managers’ organiza-
tional performance and measurement in the public sector: Toward service, effort
and accomplishment reported. American Review of Public Administration, 28(1), 90.
Eterno, J. A., & Silverman, E. B. (2006). The New York City Police Department's
CompStat: Dream or nightmare? International Journal of Police Science & Manage-
ment, 8(3), 218–231.
Eterno, J. A., & Silverman, E. B. (2010). The NYPD's CompStat: Compare statistics or
compose statistics? International Journal of Police Science & Management, 12(3),
426–449.
Eterno, J. A., & Silverman, E. B. (2012). The crime numbers game: Management by
manipulation. New York: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis.
Flamholtz, E. (1996). Effective organizational control: A framework, applications, and
implications. European Management Journal, 14(6), 596–611.
Forrester, J. W. (1961). Industrial dynamics (vol. 2). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ghaffarzadegan, N., Lyneis, J., & Richardson, G. P. (2011). How small system dynamics
models can help the public policy process. System Dynamics Review,
27(1), 22–44.
Gibson, E., & Julnes, P. D. L. (2010). A bridge too far? Maryland's BRACStat as a
regional network governance and performance management tool. State & Local
Government Review, 42(2), 168–175.
Gross, B. M. (1969). The new systems budgeting. Public Administration Review, 29(2),
113–137.
Hall, M., & Holt, R. (2003). Developing a culture of performance learning in UK public
sector project management. Public Performance and Management Review, 26(3),
263.
Hamelin, F., & Spenlehauer, V. (2013). Managing to reinvent strong publicness in a
privatized world. Public Organization Review, 1–20.
Harr, D. J., & Godfrey, J. T. (1992). The total unit cost approach to government financial
management. Government Accountants Journal, 40(4), 15.
Hatry, H. P. (2006). Performance measurement: Getting results. 2nd ed. Washington,
DC: Urban Institute Press.
Hatry, H. P. (2007). Results-based budgeting. In F. S. Redburn, R. J. Shea, & T. F. Buss
(Eds.), Performance management and budgeting: How governments can learn from
experience (pp. 293–318). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Hirst, M. K. (1983). Reliance on accounting performance measures, task uncertainty,
and dysfunctional behavior: Some extensions. Journal of Accounting Research,
21(2), 596–605.
Hofstede, G. (1978). The poverty of management control philosophy. Academy of
Management Review, 3(3), 450–461.
Hofstede, G. (1981). Management control of public and not-for-profit activities.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 6(3), 193–211.
Hofstede, G. H. (1967). The game of budget control: How to live with budgetary
standards and yet be motivated by them. Assen, NL: Tavistock.
Hood, C. (2006). Gaming in targetworld: The targets approach to managing British
public services. Public Administration Review, 66(4), 515–521.
Bianchi & Williams / PUBLIC PERFORMANCE & MANAGEMENT REVIEW 421
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r C
arm
ine
 B
ian
ch
i] 
at 
05
:17
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
Hood, C. (2012). Public management by numbers as a performance-enhancing drug:
Two hypotheses. Public Administration Review, 72(s1), 85–92.
Hopwood, A. G. (1972). An empirical study of the role of accounting data in
performance evaluation. Journal of Accounting Research, 10, 156–182.
Johnson, B. (2005). Strategies for successful joined up government initiatives. John
Curtin Institute for Public Policy, Institute of Public Administration of Australia,
and Department of Premier and Cabinet. Available at http://www.mendeley.com/
download/public/18117401/5090304102/1ccdc9b6009c3ec313091ea95874283e4519
74d1/dl.pdf, accessed February 19, 2015.
Joyce, P. G. (2011). The Obama administration and PBB: Building on the legacy of
federal performance-informed budgeting? Public Administration Review, 71(3),
356–367.
Judge won't delay order on policing. (2013, September 17). New York Times, p. A19.
Keehley, P. (1997). Benchmarking for best practices in the public sector: Achieving per-
formance breakthroughs in federal, state, and local agencies (1st ed.). San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Keehley, P., & Abercrombie, N. N. (2008). Benchmarking in the public and nonprofit
sectors: Best practices for achieving performance breakthroughs (2nd ed.). San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Kelman, S., & Friedman, J. N. (2009). Performance improvement and performance
dysfunction: An empirical examination of distortionary impacts of the emergency
room wait-time target in the English National Health Service. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 19(4), 917–946.
Leeuw, F. L. (2003). Evaluation and New Public Management in the Netherlands. In
H. Wollmann (Ed.), Evaluation in public sector reform: Concepts and practice in
international perspective (pp. 104–117). Bodmin, UK: Elgar.
Lu, H. (1998). Performance budgeting resuscitated: Why is it still inviable? Journal of
Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial Management, 10(2), 151–172.
Maple, J., & Mitchell, C. (1999). The crime fighter: How you can make your community
crime free. New York, NY: Doubleday.
March, J. G. (1987). Ambiguity and accounting: The elusive link between information
and decision making. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 12(2), 153–168.
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley.
Matheson, A., Scanlan, G., & Tanner, R. (1997). Strategic management in government:
Extending the reform model in New Zealand. Benchmarking, evaluation and
strategic management in the public sector. Available at http://www.oecd.org/
newzealand/1902913.pdf, accessed February 19, 2015.
Mazerolle, L., McBroom, J., & Rombouts, S. (2011). CompStat in Australia: An analysis
of the spatial and temporal impact. Journal of Criminal Justice, 39(2), 128–136.
Mazerolle, L., Rombouts, S., & McBroom, J. (2007). The impact of COMPSTAT on
reported crime in Queensland. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies
& Management, 30(2), 237–256.
McNair, C. J., & Leibfried, K. H. J. (1992). Benchmarking: A tool for continuous
improvement. 1st ed. New York: HarperBusiness.
Melkers, J. (2006). On the road to improved performance: Changing organizational
communication through performance management. Public Performance & Manage-
ment Review, 30(1), 73–95.
Merchant, K. A. (1982). The control function of management. Sloan Management
Review, 23(4), 43–55.
422 PPMR = March 2015
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r C
arm
ine
 B
ian
ch
i] 
at 
05
:17
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
Merton, R. K. (1940). Bureaucratic structure and personality. Social Forces, 18(4),
560–568.
Meyer, M. W., & Gupta, V. (1994). The performance paradox. Research in Organiza-
tional Behaviour, 16, 309–369.
Meyer, M. W., & O'Shaughnessy, K. C. (1993). Organizational design and the
performance paradox. In R. Swedberg (Ed.), Explorations in economic sociology
(pp. 249–278). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Micheli, P., & Neely, A. (2010). Performance measurement in the public sector in
England: Searching for the golden thread. Public Administration Review, 70(4),
591–600.
Mintzberg, H. (1975). Impediments to the use of management information. New York:
National Association of Accountants.
Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations: A synthesis of the research.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Moynihan, D. P. (2008). The dynamics of performance management: Constructing
information and reform. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Moynihan, D. P., & Landuyt, N. (2009). How do public organizations learn? Bridging
cultural and structural perspectives. Public Administration Review, 69(6), 1097–1105.
Moynihan, D. P., & Pandey, S. K. (2010). The big question for performance
management: Why do managers use performance information? Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 20(4), 849–866.
Moynihan, D. P., Lavertu, S., & Kamensky, J. M. (2012). Does involvement in
performance management routines encourage performance information use?
Evaluating GPRA and PART [with Commentary]. Public Administration Review,
72(4), 592–604.
Musell, R. M. (2009). Understanding government budgets: A practical guide.
New York: Routledge.
Otley, D. T. (1978). Budget use and managerial performance. Journal of Accounting
Research, 16(1), 122–149.
Ouchi, W. G. (1979). A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control
mechanisms. Management Science, 25(9), 833–848.
Parsons, M. B. (1957). Performance budgeting in the Philippines. Public Administration
Review, 17(3), 173–179.
Perez, T., & Rushing, R. (2007). The CitiStat model: How data-driven government can
increase efficiency and effectiveness. Center for American Progress, 5. Available
at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/04/pdf/citistat_
report.pdf http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/04/pdf/
citistat_report.pdf, accessed February 19, 2015.
Pollitt, C. (2003). Joined‐up government: A survey. Political Studies Review, 1(1),
34–49.
Radnor, Z. (2005, September). Developing a typology of organisational gaming. Paper
presented at the EGPA Conference, Bern.
Radnor, Z. (2010). Hitting the target and missing the point? Developing an understand-
ing of organisational gaming. In W. Van Dooren & S. Van de Walle (Eds.), Perfor-
mance information in the public sector: How it is used (pp. 94–105). London: Taylor
& Francis.
Rich, M. (2012, July 6). “No Child” Law whittled down by White House. New York
Times, p. A1.
Rich, M. (2013, April 3). Latest cheating scandal reignites debate over tests’ role. New
York Times, p. A13.
Bianchi & Williams / PUBLIC PERFORMANCE & MANAGEMENT REVIEW 423
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r C
arm
ine
 B
ian
ch
i] 
at 
05
:17
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
Rich, M., & Delaquérière, A. (2012, November 26). Educator aided others at cheating,
U.S. charges. New York Times, p. A15.
Richardson, G. P., & Pugh, A. I., III. (1981). Introduction to system dynamics modeling
with DYNAMO. New York, NY: Productivity Press.
Rivenbark, W. C., & Ballard, E. C. (2012). Using citizen surveys to influence and
document culture change in local government. Public Performance & Management
Review, 35(3), 475–484.
Rivenbark, W. C., & Carter, K. L. (2000). Benchmarking and cost accounting: The
North Carolina approach. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting and Financial
Management, 12(1), 125–137.
Rouwette, E., Jongebreur, W., van Hooff, P., Heijmen, T., & Vennix, J. (2004). Modeling
crime control in the Netherlands. Available at http://www.systemdynamics.org/confer-
ences/2004/SDS_2004/PAPERS/270ROUWE.pdf, accessed February 19, 2015.
Ruderman, W. (2012, June 28). Crime report manipulation is common among New York
Police study finds. New York Times, p. A19.
Sanger, M. B. (2008). Getting to the roots of change: Performance management and
organizational culture. Public Performance & Management Review, 31(4), 621–653.
Sanger, M. B. (2013). Does measuring performance lead to better performance? Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management, 32(1), 185–203.
Sherwood, F. P. (1954). Administrative uses of performance budgets. Accounting
Publication Series. Chicago: Municipal Finance Officers Association.
Silverman, E. B. (1999). NYPD battles crime: Innovative strategies in policing. Boston:
Northeastern University Press.
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 69(1), 99–118.
Simons, R. (2005). Levers of organization design: How managers use accountability
systems for greater performance and commitment. Boston: Harvard Business School
Press.
Smith, M. (2013). Records: Texas plant hadn't told feds about explosive fertilizer. CNN.
Available at http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/25/us/texas-explosion-plant, accessed
February 19, 2015.
Smith, P. (1993). Outcome‐related performance indicators and organizational control in
the public sector. British Journal of Management, 4(3), 135–151.
Smith, P. (1995). On the unintended consequences of publishing performance data in the
public sector. International Journal of Public Administration, 18(2/3), 277–310.
Sterman, J. (2000). Business dynamics: Systems thinking and modeling for a complex
world. Boston: Irwin/McGraw-Hill.
Vakkuri, J., & Meklin, P. (2006). Ambiguity in performance measurement: A theoretical
approach to organisational uses of performance measurement. Financial Account-
ability & Management, 22(3), 235–250.
Van Dooren, W., & Van de Walle, S. (Eds.). (2008). Performance information in the
public sector: How it is used. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Van Dooren, W., Halligan, J., & Bouckaert, G. (2010). Performance management in the
public sector. New York: Routledge.
van Nispen, F. K.M., & Posseth, J. J.A. (2006). Performance budgeting in the
Netherlands: Beyond arithmetic. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 6(4), 37–62.
Van Thiel, S., & Leeuw, F. L. (2002). The performance paradox in the public sector.
Public Performance & Management Review, 267–281.
Warren, K. (2000). The softer side of strategy dynamics. Business Strategy Review, 11
(1), 45–58.
424 PPMR = March 2015
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r C
arm
ine
 B
ian
ch
i] 
at 
05
:17
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
Warren, K. (2008). Strategic management dynamics. New York: John Wiley.
Weisburd, D., Mastrofski, S. D., McNally, A., Greenspan, R., & Willis, J. J. (2003).
Reforming to preserve: CompStat and strategic problem solving in American
policing. Criminology & Public Policy, 2(3), 421–456.
Willis, J. J., Kochel, T. R., & Mastrofski, S. D. (2010). The co-implementation of
CompStat and community policing: A national assessment. Washington, DC: Office
of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.
Willoughby, K. G. (2004). Performance measurement and budget balancing: State
government perspective. Public Budgeting and Finance, 24(2), 21–39.
Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982). Broken windows. Atlantic Monthly, 249, 29–38.
Winch, G., & Joyce, P. (2006). Exploring the dynamics of building, and losing,
consumer trust in B2C eBusiness. International Journal of Retail & Distribution
Management, 34(7), 541–555.
Winerip, M., Severson, K., & Brown, R. (2013, March 30). 35 Indicted in test scandal at
Atlanta schools. New York Times, p. A1.
Wolstenholme, E. F. (1999). Qualitative vs quantitative modelling: The evolving
balance. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 50(4), 422–428.
Carmine Bianchi is Professor of Business & Public Management at the University
of Palermo (Italy), where he is also the scientific coordinator of CED4 System
Dynamics Group. He is the director of the PhD program in “Model Based Public
Planning, Policy Design, and Management”, and of the Masters course in “Man-
aging Business Growth through System Dynamics & Accounting Models.
A Strategic Control Perspective”. Bianchi is a member of the Steering Committee
of the European Master in System Dynamics, an Erasmus Mundus funded
program, patronized by the European Commission. He has published in several
academic and professional journals, where he also serves as a member of
the Scientific Committee. Bianchi has research and consulting experience with
public and private sector organizations in designing policies and outlining con-
sistent programs to link strategy and implementation. Consulting and education
projects that he has conducted cover strategic planning and control, perfor-
mance management and reporting, as well as System Dynamics modeling
for performance improvement and crisis prevention (Dynamic Performance
Management). In the last decade Bianchi has been strengthening an inter-
national network related on “Dynamic Performance Management”. He has been
collaborating with a number of universities all over the world, ranging from
Europe to Asia and the United States.
Daniel W. Williams has taught at Baruch College since 1995, after nearly 20
years with the Virginia Medicaid program. He teaches budgeting, performance
measurement, and ethics. His research focuses primarily on budgeting, perfor-
mance measurement, and the history of public administration. He has shared
the Outstanding Paper Award from the International Institute of Forecasters,
and the Jesse Burkhead Award from the Board of Directors of Public Finance
Publications, Inc.
Bianchi & Williams / PUBLIC PERFORMANCE & MANAGEMENT REVIEW 425
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [P
ro
fes
so
r C
arm
ine
 B
ian
ch
i] 
at 
05
:17
 01
 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
